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PUBLIC ENEMY LAWS-CONSTITU-
TIONALITY OF.-[New Jersey] Most
legislative attempts to control
criminality are generally, in appli-
cation, designed to punish violators
who may come within the defined
limits of the act regardless of eco-
nomic position, class distinctions.
or personal fame. They seek to
prevent crime by punishing crime.
However such legislation has not
always been successful in protect-
ing the community, and the legis-
latures of several states have en-
deavored to enact laws which might
prevent a criminal act by defining
and classifying groups likely to
commit such offenses. In other
words the legislatures have pro-
ceeded upon the theory that cer-
tain persons in the community are
more likely than others to commit
crimes.
Under this broad and illusive
principle, three types of statutes in
particular have been passed, all de-
signed to punish for what persons
are, rather than what they did.
First is the Habitual Criminal
Laws; second, the well-known Va-
grancy Acts; finally the statutes
concerned in the present discus-
sion, the "Reputation" or "Public
Enemy" laws.
The Constitutionality of the Va-
grancy and Habitual Criminal Acts
appears to be well settled. As to
Vagrancy see 8 R. C. L. 339, 92 A.
L. R. 68. For Habitual Criminal
Acts see 8 R. C. L. 271, 82 A. L. R.
345. As to the validity of the "Rep-
utation" statutes, the case arising
in New Jersey and now pending in
the Supreme Court of the United
States brings this strikingly to the
fore. State v. Lanzetti, and State
v. Pius, 118 N. J. L. 212, 192 Atl.
89 (1937), reviewed in 120 N. J. L.
189, 198 Atl. 837 (1938).
In this case the Supreme Court
of New Jersey declared valid the
"Gangster Act." This act provides
for the punishment by fine not ex-
ceeding ten thousand dollars and
imprisonment not exceeding twenty
years or both of "any person not
engaged in any lawful occupation,
known to be a member of a gang
consisting of two or more persons,
who has been convicted at least
three times of being a disorderly
person, or who has been convicted
of any crime in this or any other
state . . . ." Participants in labor
disputes are expressly excepted.
N. J. Rev. Stat. (1937) §2:136-4.
In the state court the defendants
were convicted of having violated
the act and in answer to their al-
legations questioning its constitu-
tionality, the court found that they
were not denied due process nor
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the equal protection of the laws,
relying on a previous case of sim-
ilar character. State v. Bell, 15
N. J. Misc. 109, 188 Atl. 737 (1937).
In the case just cited the court rea-
soned that since the statute pro-
vides for the apprehension and
punishment of a class that menaces
the security of persons and prop-
erty the act does not deprive the
defendants of due process, and that
it was within the province of the
legislature to classify persons with
respect to the criminal law provid-
ing the classification is a reasonable
one. This latter argument also dis-
posing of the equal protection ob-
jection that was raised. Two other
contentions were raised in the prin-
cipal case. The first concerned the
defense of double jeopary which the
court summarily disposes of by say-
ing that "no prior conviction was
even suggested" The other, that of
the act being ex post facto, was
thrown out on the ground that the
act was based not on punishing con-
victed criminals because they are
such, but on voluntary member-
ship in a gang and voluntary ab-
stention from work.
The New Jersey Court, in at-
tempting to answer the equal pro-
tection allegations has failed any-
where to distinguish the ability of
the legislature to classify affirma-
tive conduct resulting in a certain
type of criminality and what the
legislature did here, namely, make
reputation an offense. In the one
case the classification results be-
cause of the commission of an act,
in the other the classification at-
taches through association. This
goes even further than the Con-
spiracy statutes which do not make
association of itself unlawful, but
rely on the illegality of the pur-
pose, or the means used to obtain
that purpose.
The present statute is not the
first attempt by states to make
criminal the association with dis-
reputable persons. An outstand'
ing example of a similar act was
the amendment to the Illinois va-
grancy act of 1933 which sought to
classify as vagabonds those who
were reputed to be habitual vio-
lators of the criminal law or car-
riers of concealed weapons. Ill.
Sess. Law (1933) p. 489, §1. The
Illinois Supreme Court in declar-
ing the act unconstitutional stated
that it was an arbitrary and unrea-
sonable classification, and that the
object of the due process clause is
to preserve the personal and prop-
erty rights of a person against ar-
bitrary action. People v. Belcas-
tro, 356 Ill. 144, 190 N. E. 301(1934).
A similar Michigan statute likewise
was declared unconstitutional in
People v. Licavoli, 264 Mich. 463,
250 N. W. 520 (1933). See also
Feigen, Constitutionality of "Pub-
lic Enemy" Laws (1934) 24 J. of
Crim. Law 954; and Tipton, "Valid-
ity of the Reputation Amendment
to the Vagrancy Statute" (1934) 25
J. of Crim. Law 279, 92 A. L. R.
f228.
The due process argument as it
will be raised in the Court will be
largely on the broad principle fol-
lowed by a majority of the courts
and to which the United States
Supreme Court has committed it-
self, viz., that due process is satis-
fied if the statute is sufficiently
certain and definite to inform citi-
zens of the acts it is intended to
prohibit. 14 Am. Juris. 779;
United States v. Cohen Grocery,
255 U. S. 81 (1920); Whitney v.
People of the State of California,
274 U. S. 357 (1926); People v.
Belcastro, supra; State v. Gaynor,
119 N. J. L 582, 197 Atl. 360 (1938).
It seems as a corollary that the act
must be reasonable and not one
which might subject the accused to
an arbitrary invasion of his per-
sonal rights. The question here for
determination, then, is whether the
act is such a definite and reason-
able one that the accused is pro-
tected.
It seems that section 4 of the act
steps beyond the just and neces-
sary legislation needed to protect
the community. This section,
quoted heretofore, has potentiali-
ties of tremendous social signifi-
cance. The discretion in the appli-
cation of such a statute, must be
guarded with a scrutiny not be-
coming criminal legislation. While
it is useful in punishing those who
associate with criminal intent, there
is no safeguard for the innocent
who by circumstances fall within
its terms. Surely it was not the
intention of the legislature to see
ordinary citizens, possessing no
criminal intentions whatsoever,
suffer such extreme punishment
with no protection other than the
discretion of the prosecutor. To
allow this kind of a statute to re-
main on the books seems only too
apparent an infringement of the
personal liberties protected by the
due process clause of the 14th




GOOD TIME SERVED UNDER.-[Fed-
eral] Substantial disagreement
exists among the courts of the na-
tion concerning the judicial recog-
nition to be accorded an imprison-
ment illegal because of the invalid-
ity of the sentence. The learning
devoted to this field of criminal
procedure is meager; and this be-
cause of the relative paucity of
cases presenting the problem.
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The legal attributes of a void
sentence to be evaluated in resen-
tencing a prisoner who had served
under an illegal imprisonment were
considered in the case of King v.
United States, 98 F. (2d) 291
(App. D. C. 1938); and it was held
that a void sentence may not be ig-
nored "in determining whether a
resentence subjects the prisoner to
more punishment than the legal
maximum for his offense." That
is, if the time served under the void
sentence coupled with the term of
the resentence were in excess of
the statutory maximum of pre-
scribed punishment, the new sen-
tence would be illegal, or rather,
the excessive part would be invali-
dated. Cf. In re Bonner, 151 U. S.
242 (1893). Thus a credit is given
to the prisoner for the length of
the former incarceration; and such
credit will be presumed to have
been applied if the new term added
to the actual imprisonment under
the void sentence is within the
court's jurisdiction in the imposi-
tion of punishment.
As was recognized in the case
of Tinkoff v. United States, 86 F.
(2d) 868, 880 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936),
jurisdictions are in disagreement as
to whether credit should be given
for imprisonment under an illegal
sentence upon a valid resentence.
The extreme view is taken by the
Alabama court in Minto v. State, 9
Ala. App. 95, 64 So. 369 (1913), and
Ex parte Gunter, 193 Ala. 486, 69
So. 442 (1915) that a void sentence
is without legal significance or ap-
plication. In the Minto case, supra,
the court argued: "The defendant
could not have served any part of
a former sentence of imprison-
ment, as there has been no such
sentence which the law can recog-
nize." The antithesis of this is
found in the Kentucky court's view
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in Jackson v. Commonwealth, 187
Ky. 760, 220 S. W. 1045 (1920),
wherein it was stated that in re-
sentencing the defendants - the
court being unconcerned as to
whether the original sentence was
void or merely erroneous-full
credit should be allowed for time
served under the erroneous sen-
tence. The court, motivated by
justice rather than legal metaphys-
ics, said: "It would be an injus-
tice, as well as a flagrant invasion
of their legal rights, to require
them to serve their term, or any
part thereof, twice." Ibid., at 1046.
In Bennet v. Hollowel, 203 Iowa
352, 212 N. W. 70: (1927) not the
remotest corollary of Minto v.
State, supra, is recognized. The
Iowa court goes even farther than
the liberal Kentucky court in at-
taching legal attributes to a void
sentence. The petitioner was orig-
inally sentenced to seven years in
the penitentiary for the crime of
false pretenses. After having served
five months the prisoner escaped,
was tried and convicted of the
crime of escape, and was given a
five year term in the penitentiary,
which was to commence at the ex-
piration of the seven year sentence.
The original sentence was void for
want of jurisdiction; after having
served sixty months under it, the
prisoner petitioned for habeas cor-
pus. The court, in issuing the writ,
held that the time served under the
void sentence, which was equiva-
lent to the new sentence, should be
deemed to apply to the latter sen-
tence. The result is far-reaching
in that time served under an il-
legal sentence for the crime of
false pretenses is applied to a valid
sentence for an entirely unrelated
offense, to-wit, "escape." It is
highly probable that the dotrine of
this case will be confined to factual
situations as peculiar and sympa-
thetic as the present.
The Delaware Court, in Kozlow-
ski v. Board of Trustees of NetL
Castle County Workhouse, 2 Harr
29, 118 Atl. 596 (1921), joined the
jurisdictions dissenting from the
Minto v. State doctrine. The peti-
tioner, after having served four-
teen days under a void sentence,
was resentenced for the statutory
maximum of one year. The court,
in allowing habeas corpus, held
that the fourteen days served un-
der the void sentence plus the one
year resentence was in excess of
the legal maximum. The subse-
quent Delaware decision in Biddle
v. Board of Trustees of New Castle
Workhouse, 3 Harr 432, 138 Atl. 631
(1927), did not repudiate, but
soundly qualified the holding in the
Kozlowski case, supra. The atti-
tude expressed there is that, though
incarceration before valid sentence
added to such sentence may exceed
the prescribed maximum, the pris-
oner cannot be discharged on ha-
beas corpus before having served
that part of the term which the
court could legally impose. Or,
conversely, the prisoner could be
released if imprisonment before
resentence coupled with the time
of incarceration under the valid
sentence was equal to or in excess
of the legal limit of confinement.
This is an application of the sever-
ability theory of an excessive sen-
tence (In re Bonner, supra; 51 L.
R. A. (N. s.) 377, Note 2) to a
situation where excessive punish-
ment resulted from a failure to
consider the duration of imprison-
ment under a void sentence. The
excess is invalidated and the pris-
oner is required to serve the re-
mainder. Concluding that such a
result is logical and reasonable and
entailing no hardships, the court
said: "The State is protected, the
conviction is undisturbed, and the
prisoner is not injured by the mis-
take because his discharge will be
granted when he has served the
legal part of his sentence." Ibid.,
at 632 of 138 Atl..
To give judicial recognition to
incarceration under an illegal sen-
tence in determining the term of
the resentence is a result compat-
ible with reason and justice. To
refuse it would bring "a result
more consistent with dry logic than
natural justice." 9 A. L. R. 958.
Full credit should be given for an
illegal imprisonment; and if upon
resentence excessive punishment is
inflicted in that the time served
under the void sentence has been
ignored, that part of the sentence
beyond statutory limits should be
invalidated. The prisoner is neither
penalized by nor permitted to capi-
talize upon judicial blunder.
In the instant case, the court dis-
allows a deduction from a valid re-
sentence a good time allowance in
respect of time previously served
under a void sentence. This con-
clusion was derived from two
thoughts: 1. That such good time
allowance was not within the pur-
view of the statute. 18 USCA S'ec.
709a, 710; 2. That as "the former
sentence was not only at an end
before the new sentence was im-
posed but was also 'void,' i. e., not
entitled to legal effect," the good
time earned under the void sen-
tence cannot be considered in de-
termining whether the resentence
exceeded the statutory maximum.
As for the second contention:
By some judicial prestidigitation
the void sentence is to have legal
effect "in determining whether a
resentence subjects the prisoner to
more punishment than the legal
maximum for his offense," but is
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to be detached of legal significance
as far as good time rights are con-
cerned-the same thing legal and
illegal in one decision. Suffice it
to say that if the court is correct
in according recognition to the
duration of incarceration under a
void sentence, in determining
whether the resentence was exces-
sive-and logic and justice make
such a position tenable-consis-
tency demands that the accrual of
good time under the void sentence
be given the same recognition. It
is strange logic that places as thing
within judicial contemplation on
the inhale and withdraws it on the
exhale.
As to the first proposition: 1.
The statute, providing that "when
a prisoner has two or more sen-
tences, the aggregate of his several
sentences shall be the basis upon
which his deduction shall be esti-
mated" (18 USCA Sec. 710), has
been held to refer to two sentences
which are in existence at the same
time. Morgan v. Aderhold, 73 F.
(2d) 171 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934). Rec-
ognizing the legal significance of a
void sentence (Jackson v. Common-
wealth, supra), it would not abuse
the prerogative of statutory inter-
pretation to have the statute com-
prehend, also, a situation, as in the
present case, where the two sen-
tences arose from and applied to
but one offense. Why the statute
should be held to apply in a case
of two or more sentences, each im-
posed for a different offense,
though pronounced at the same
time, and not in the case of two
sentences imposed at different in-
tervals, but addressed to the same
offense, is not easily understand-
able. It is a hard presumption that
Congress intended a forfeiture be-
cause of an error in the judicial
process of sentencing notwithstand-
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ing prisoner's meritorious behavior.
2. The provision (18 USCA Sec.
709a) that a sentence of imprison-
ment "shall commence to run from
the date on which such person is
received at the penitentiary," and
the prohibition of any other meth-
od of computation in a sentence,
ought not to block the accrual of
good time earned under the void
sentence from consideration in re-
sentencing. If judicial cognizance
be accorded the void sentence
under the Jackson v. Common-
wealth doctrine, which was ap-
proved in the principal case, then
the sentence did commence to run
at the date of actual incarceration.
The resentence does not abrogate
the rights derived from the prior
imprisonment. Ex parte Silva, 38
Cal. App. 98, 175 Pac. 481 (1918);
Ex parte Bouchard, 38 Cal. App.
441, 176 Pac. 692 (1918); but see
Ex parte Fritz, 179 Cal. 415, 177
Pac. 157 (1918) which disapproves
of the Silva and Bouchard cases
without challenging their reason-
ing. See also State ex rel Bone v.
Barr, Warden, 133 Iowa 132, 110 N.
W. 280 (1"907) citing with approval
Howard v. United States, 75 Fed.
986 (C. C. A. 6th, 1896).
It may be argued that by allow-
ing a credit for good time under
the illegal sentence the rule would
also prohibit any good time priv-
ileges under the resentence in
event of misbehavior during the
void incarceration. Justice dictates
the adoption of a rule of law favor-
ing good behavior rather than
capitulating to misbehavior.
LEONARD SHAPiRo
EMPLOYMENT BY COURT OF SPE-
CIAL PROSECUTOR WHERE PROSECUT-
ING ATTORNEY Is DIsQUALIFIED.-
[Indiana] The judge of the crim-
inal court of Marion County on
his own motion appointed special
prosecutors, over the objection of
the regular prosecuting attorney,
to investigate suspected violations
of the law concerning a primary
election. Reports released by the
recount commissioners in contests
respecting the nomination for the
offices of mayor and sheriff in the
Marion County primary election
indicated that one of the regular
prosecutor's deputies served as
clerk of the board in one of the
precincts where discrepancies be-
tween the official and the recount
vote appeared. Twelve members
of the prosecutor's staff were also
candidates in this primary. In an
original action in the Indiana Su-
preme Court by the regular prose-
cutor a writ of prohibition against
the special prosecutors was granted.
The Court said, "The prosecuting
attorney is a constitutional judicial
.officer and cannot be removed upon
mere suspicion or rumor but only
where it is established that he is an
interested party or otherwise clear-
ly incapacitated." State ex. rel.
Spencer v. Criminal Court of Mar-
ion County, et al., 15 N. E. (2d)
1020 (1938).
Acting under a statute, Ind. Rev.
Stats. (Burns 1914) §9407, giving it
a right to appoint a special prose-
cutor for a term when the regular
prosecutor is absent, the Indiana
Court has appointed a special
prosecutor when the regular prose-
cutor is absent, Choen v. State, 85
Ind. 209 (1882), where the prose-
cuting attorney -is disqualified by
having been attorney for the ac-
cused for many years, Perfect v.
State, 197 Ind. 401, 141 N. E. 52
(1923), where he was disqualified
to act in his official capacity when
one of his deputies was charged
with crime growing out of alleged
official misconduct, State ex. tel.
Williams v. Ellis, 184 Ind. 307, 11'2
N. E. 98 (1916), and where he was
disqualified because of political in-
terest from conducting the prose-
cution of an election inspector in-
dicted for consenting to the re-
moval of a hundred and fifty bal-
lots from his possession as election
official, Huffman v. State, 183 Ind.
698, 109 N. E. 401 (1915).
The Illinois and Missouri courts
hold similar statutes as merely de-
claratory of the common law and
have said that the courts have in-
herent power to appoint a special
prosecutor when the prosecuting
attorney is disqualified by interest
to act in his official capacity: State
v. Jones, 306 Mo. 437, 268 S. W. 83
(1924) (when his car and defend-
ant's car were in a collision); Wil-
son v. Marshall County, 257 Ill.
App. 220 (1930) (where the county
board was permitted to employ
special attorneys in a particular
case when the regular prosecutor
was disqualified and the court had
made a valid appointment).
However, whether the court acts
under a statute or under its inher-
ent power the interest of the prose-
cutor must first be established as
a fact, State ex. rel. Williams v.
Ellis, supra, State v. Jones, supra.
The appointment cannot be made
on what the court in the principal
case calls "mere suspicion or ru-
mor" of such interest, but the ap-
pointment can be made as in the
instant case by the court on its
own motion, Huffman v. State,
supra, or upon the petition of a
citizen, People v. Northrup, 184 Ill.
App. 638 (1914).
In State ex. rel. Williams v. Ellis,
supra, the Indiana court faced a
situation similar to that in the prin-
cipal case and upheld the appoint-
ment of a special prosecutor. But
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in that case the grand jury re-
quested the appointment of a spe-
cial attorney and the regular pros-
ecutor filed his written consent to
the appointment, whereas in the
instant case the appointment was
made on the ex parte motion of the
judge and over the objection of
the regular prosecutor. In Huff-
man v. State, supra, the Indiana
court again upheld the appoint-
ment of a special prosecutor al-
though made on the motion of the
judge and over the objection of the
regular prosecutor. In that case,
however, there was an actual in-
dictment of the person held to dis-
qualify the regular prosecutor be-
cause of interest whereas in the
principal case the court seems to
specifically object to the fact that
the appointment was made "upon
mere suspicion or rumor" before
the guilt of anyone had been def-
initely established.
Although under the Indiana stat-
ute or under the inherent power of
the court there is authority for the
appointment of a special attorney
by the judge on his own motion
and over the objection of the regu-
lar prosecutor when the prosecu-
tor is disqualified, there is no au-
thority for such an appointment
before the interest of. the regular
prosecutor has been established as
a fact-in this case by the subse-
quent indictment of the deputy
prosecutor and other members of
the regular prosecutor's staff. Con-
sequently in its decision in the
principal case the court is well
within the law.
On the question of whether such
appointments actually promote jus-
tice there are convincing argu-
ments on both sides. The main
objection to this practice of em-
ploying special prosecutors is that
"they are usually employed by
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private individuals solely to secure
a conviction and their zeal and
energies are bent to accomplish
that end losing sight of the fact
that the accused is entitled to a
fair trial." State v. Morreaux, 254
Mo. 398, f62 S. W. 158 (1914).
However it is said that "the prose-
cuting attorney owes a duty to
both the state and the defendant
and if the facts are such as to pre-
clude the exercise of his full duty
to both he should step aside." State
ex. rel. Williams v. Ellis, supra. In
the case of a political investigation
such as this the better view would
seem to be that which sanctions
such appointments in order that in
the eyes of the public, at least, the




MINos.-[South Dakota] The de-
fendant, in the recent South Da-
kota case of State v. Schull, 279 N.
W. 241 (1938), was convicted for
violation of chapter twelve of the
Special Session Laws for 1933
which states: "It shall be unlaw-
ful for any licensee under the pro-
visions of this act to sell or give
any non-intoxicating beer or wine
to any person under the age of
eighteen years." Relying on section
3583, subdivision five, Revised Code
of 1919, the provisions of which
are: "All persons are capable of
committing crimes, except those
belonging to the following classes
. . . persons who committed the
act under an ignorance or mistake
of fact which disproves any crim-
inal "intent . . .," the defendant
requested the trial court to instruct
the jury that the defendant acted
in good faith, the beer being sold
by an employee during his absence
and contrary to his express in-
structions, and that the appearance
of the prosecuting witness, who
stated he was eighteen years of age
at the time of the sale, was that of
an adult. The trial court refused
to instruct the jury in this manner,
and its decision was affirmed by
the South Dakota. Supreme Court.
Malum prohibitum acts are those
barred under penalty for the pub-
lic interest; they are not crimes in-
herently evil in themselves, but
are made crimes by a legislature
which believes that such acts
should be prohibited for the com-
mon good. Whether scienter is a
necessary element of a statutory
crime, though not expressed in the
statute, is a question of legislative
intent to be answered only by a
construction of a statute. Punish-
ment for an illegal act done by one
who is ignorant of the facts which
make it illegal, is not contrary to
due process of law. United States
v. Baiint et al., 258 U. S. 250 (1922).
When a statute makes an act in-
dictable, irrespective of guilty
knowledge, then even "sincere ig-
norance of fact" is not a defense.
State v. Dorman, 9 S. D. 528, 70 N.
W. 848 (1897). In State v. Sasse,
6 S. D. 212, 60 N. W. 853 (1894),
involving a statute similar to that
of the principal case, it was held
that since the word "knowingly"
was omitted from the act in that
section relating to minors, and no
word of similar import was used
to denote such meaning, it is evi-
dent that good faith is not import-
ant, nor proof of criminal intent
necessary for conviction where
there had been in fact a sale of in-
toxicating liquor to one under the
age of twenty-one years. Other
jurisdictions have similarly held
that the mere fact of selling intox-
icating liquors to a minor consti-
tues the entire offense. Seele v.
State, 85 Neb. 109, 122 N. W. 686
(1909); State v. Gilmore, 80 Vt.
51"4, 68 Atl. 658 (1908); State v.
Nichols, 67 W. Va. 659, 69 S. E. 304
(1910).
The majority of the states have
statutes prohibiting the sale of
liquors to minors wherein the
word "knowingly" or one of equiv-
alent import is absent. The justifi-
cation for such an extreme rule is
that the act in question is a police
regulation, and the legislature in-
tended to inflict the penalty, irre-
spective of the knowledge or mo-
tives of the offender. The object
of the statute was to prohibit ab-
solutely sales of liquors to minors
by persons licensed to sell, and the
latter, in procuring their licenses,
are fully aware of the penalties for
violation thereof, and accordingly,
act at their own peril. State v.
Cain, 9 W. Va. 559 (1876); State v.
Hartfiel, 24 Wis. 60 (1869). It is a
risk incident to the business de-
fendant undertook to conduct, and
since he receives the gains con-
nected therewith, he must there-
fore assume with it all the hazards.
McCutcheon v. People, 69 Ill. 601
(1873). Texas courts are among
a minority in holding that though
it is unnecessary under Tex. Ann.
Code (Vernon, 1925), art. 693, for
the state to prove that the defend-
ant, in a prosecution for giving
liquor to a minor, knew that the
prosecuting witness was a minor,
since the word "knowingly" was
omitted from the statute, neverthe-
less, mistake of fact is available as
a defense under article 41. Gil-
breath v. State, 107 Tex. Cr. R. 110,
295 S. W. 925 (1927).
The changing attitudes of juris-
dictions on the subject of absolute
liability in prosecutions concerning
liquor sales to minors are exempli-
fied in the following Michigan cases.
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In Faulks v. People, 39 Mich. 200
(1878), it was decreed: "It can-
not be assumed that the legislature
would attempt such a wrong as to
punish as criminal an act which in-
volves no criminal intent. There
can be no crime where there is no
criminal mind." But in People v.
Roby, 52 Mich. 577, 18 N. W. 365
(1884), the court said: "It was held
in Faulks v. People, 39 Mich. 200,
under a former statute, that one
should not be convicted of the of-
fense of selling liquor to a minor
who had reason to believe and did
believe he was of age; but I doubt
if we ought so to hold under the
statute of 1881, the purpose of
which very plainly is, as I think, to
compel every person who engages
in the sale of intoxicating drinks to
keep within the statute at his per-
il." A later Michigan statute of
1887, however, declared a sale of
liquor to any minor as mere prima
facie evidence of an intent to vio-
late the law, and accordingly, de-
fendant was exempted from liabil-
ity when he relied on the minor's
statements that he was of full age
at the time of the sale, which was,
made in good faith, since the court
held that criminal intent was ma-
terial. People v. Welch, 71 Mich.
548, 39 N. W. 747 (1888).
In the principal case, defendant
was convicted, even though the sale
was consummated by an employee
during his absence, without au-
thority and contrary to instruc-
tions. The courts differ in their
attitudes toward liability of the
master for illegal sales of intoxi-
cating liquor transacted by the
agent. According to some, if the
general course of the business is
legal, the principal is not criminally
liable for the unlawful sales made
by his clerk without his knowledge
or consent, or in his absence and
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contrary to his instructions. Dan-
iel v. State, 149 Ala. 44, 43 So. 22
(1907); People v. Kryl, 168 Ill. App.
298 (1912); Lathrope v. State, 51
Ind. 192 (1875). Under this rule,
the master is not liable unless such
an unlawful act was directed, or
knowingly assented to, acquiesced
in, or permitted by the employer.
Elliot v. State, 19 Ariz. 1, 164 Pac.
1179 (1917). Kentucky, however,
held that the employer is liable for
violations of the liquor laws by his
servants or agents while pursuing
the ordinary business entrusted to
them. Paducah v. Jones, 126 Ky.
809, 104 S. W. 971 (1907). Other
jurisdictions have further extended
liability, even where the violations
were committed in the master's ab-
sence, and without his knowledge
or consent. People v. Roby, supra;
Reismier v. State, 148 Wis. 593, 135
N. W. 153 (1912). Liability has
similarly been imposed where the
act was contrary to express in-
structions of the principal. If an
agent is left to conduct a liquor
business, and he infringes any law
or statute, his principal is respon-
sible even though such agent acted
contrary to his principal's direct
commands. Carrol v. State, 63 Md.
551, 3 Atl. 29 (1885); Riley v. State,
43 Miss. 397 (1870); State v. Gil-
more, supra. But, in Steinkuhler
v. State, 100 Neb. 95, 158 N. W. 437
(1916), it was held that in sales of
intoxicating liquors to minors, al-
though the owner of the saloon is
responsible for acts of his servants,
and a sale by a servant is, in law, a
sale made by the saloon-keeper
himself, nevertheless, where the
sale is consummated in the defend-
ant's absence, and in violation of
his orders, and without his author-
ity, the master is held free from
criminal prosecution.
Where courts have held that ab-
solute liability is imposed on the
employer, they have expressed jus-
tification for such a strict rule in
similar terms to the following ex-
tract from O'Donnell v. Commis-
sioner, 108 Va. 882, 890, 92 S. E.
373, 376 (1908): "The cases which
hold that a principal is bound for
the acts of his agent, done not only
without his authority, but in vio-
lation of his instructions in the
making of the sale of ardent spir-
its, constitute an exception to the
general rule, that the doctrine of
respondeat superior does not apply
to criminal cases; and . . . the
doctrine is based upon the postu-
late that a man who engages in this
business as a licensee of the state
engages in it at his peril, and must
see to it that the requirements of
the law are rigidly complied with,
and is responsible for any failure
of any agent of his to comply with
those requirements.
Recognizing the fact that in gen-
eral, governments aim to protect
women and- minors,. and to accom-
plish such end, have so legislated
as to make it an offense to sell
liquors to minors, nevertheless, the
rule seems too harsh to hold, as in
the principal case, that an employer
is liable for a sale by his servant
even though it was made in his
absence and without his consent,
and contrary to his instructions. As
stated in Commissioner v. Stevens,
153 Mass. 421, 26 N. E. 992 (1:891),
it is carrying the doctrine of crim-
inal responsibility too far to'convict
one for an innocent mistake by his
clerk, where the principal sincerely
and honestly intended that his in-
structions be followed in good faith,
and he was not negligent in the
selection of his clerks, nor in the
precautions which he prescribed
for their guidance.
MARVIN S. FENCHEL.
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HABEAS CORPUS - UNCORROBO-
RATED TESTIMONY IN PROSECUTION
FOR RAPE OF AN INSANE FEMALE.-
[Wisconsin] Defendant was ar-
rested on a charge of having rav-
ished a female over sixteen years
of age, by force and against her
will. When the prosecutrix was
sworn, counsel for the defendant
objected to her competency on the
ground that she was of such limited
intelligence and suffering from
such insane delusions and hallu-
cinations as to be incompetent as
a witness. At the preliminary ex-
amination the prosecutrix showed a
"lack of capacity to recollect and
to narrate the facts" of the trans-
action, as well as a "failure to un-
derstand and appreciate her ob-
ligations as a witness." Her testi-
mony-, if admitted, did not show
rape by force, but defendant could
have been bound over and charged
with committing fornication with
a female who was insane-Wis.
Stat. (1935), sec. 351.06. The court
held that the prosecutrix was
wholly incompetent as a witness,
and since there was no other evi-
dence warranting the holding of
defendant for trial, the trial court
was in error in refusing a writ of
habeas corpus. Hancock v. Hall-
man, 281 N. W. 703 (1938).
The court assumed its duty on
habeas corpus to examine the evi-
dence and treated the examining
magistrate as outside of his juris-
diction since no competent evi-
dence was found upon which he
could properly have acted. Be-
cause the preliminary examination
is statutory and special, evidence
tending to establish the facts jus-
tifying a commitment, or holding
to bail for trial, is jurisdictional
like any other statutory essential.
State ex rel. Durner v. Huegin, 110
Wis. 189, 85 N. W. 1046 (1901). See
also Ex parte Bollman, 8 U. S. 75
(1807).
The Wisconsin statute under
which defendant might have been
held (sec. 351.06) is an outgrowth
of the crime of rape by force. Un-
der earlier Wisconsin law and in
other jurisdictions, defendant
would have been charged with rape
by force; the force being implied
from the victim's lack of ability to
give consent. Whitaker v. State,
50 Wis. 518, 7 N. W. 431' (1880).
Wharton, Crim. Law (12th Ed.
1931), sec. 704.
Prosecution for rape on the basis
of uncorroborated testimony of the
accusing female has always pre-
sented a difficult problem for the
courts. 26 J. Crim. L. 463. The
act of intercourse almost always
takes place in such secrecy that it
is impossible to present other per-
sons who knew of the circum-
stances or who witnessed the act.
I Hale P. C. 634. The closest wit-
ness whom the prosecution was
able to present in the principal case
was a mail carrier: prosecutrix
got out of defendant's car to take
the mail from him and then got
back in. In Rice v. State, 195 Wis.
181, 217 N. W. 697 (1928), for ex-
ample, a twelve year old girl
claimed to have had intercourse
with defendant near an open high-
way during the daylight. The court
in reversing the conviction said,
"Sex crimes, even by depraved
criminals, are crimes of seclusion
and secrecy." For this reason the
courts will not sustain such con-
victions unless the testimony and
surrounding circumstances are
clear and decisive. Cleveland v.
State, 211 Wis. 565, 248 N. W. 408
(1933). Where the evidence of the
prosecuting witness bears upon its
face evidence of unreliability, to
sustain a conviction there should
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be corroboration by other evidence
as to the principal facts relied on
to constitute the crime. O'Boyle
v. State, 100 Wis. 296, 75 N. W. 989
(1898). In the principal case a
physician who made an examina-
tion a few hours after the alleged
incident testified that although
prosecutrix had suffered an inter-
nal injury at one time, it could
not have occurred such a short
time before. He said that there
might have been some penetration,
however. This rule requiring cor-
roboration has special significance
where the prosecutrix is a person
of feeble mind. Donovan v. State,
140 Wis. 570, 122 N. W. 1022 (1909).
In the principal case the prosecu-
trix was not able to give her cor-
rect age and was able to tell her
story only through leading ques-
tions.
Thus, it can be seen how diffi-
cult the problem is rendered when
the uncorroborated prosecutrix is
feebleminded or insane. Even up
into the nineteenth century such
persons, except for lunatics during
lucid intervals, were totally barred
from acting as witnesses. A su-
perstition prevailed which branded
them as the objects of divine wrath.
Wigmore, Evidence, sec. 492. They
were one of the classes listed by
Lord Coke as being barred from
giving testimony. Co. Litt. 6b. At
first there seems to have been some
tendency on the part of our state
courts to follow this inflexible rule
of exclusion.. Livingston v. Kier-
sted, 10 Johns. (N. Y.) 362 (1813),
Armstrong v. Timmons, 3 Harr.
(Del.) 342 (1841), Phebe et al. v.
Prince et al., 1 Miss. 131 (1822)
obiter.
As a result of the scientific ad-
vancement of the nineteenth cen-
tury this superstition was over-
thrown. In 1851 in Regina v. Hill,
2 Den. & P. C. 244, a patient at a
lunatic asylum suffering under a
delusion that spirits were talking
to him was allowed to testify as
to the killing of a fellow patient.
Lord Campbell, C. J., said that
"The proper test must always be,
does the lunatic understand what
he is saying, and does he under-
stand the obligation of an oath?"
This modern doctrine was express-
ly followed by the United States
Supreme Court in District of Col-
umbia v. Armes, 107 U. S. 519
(1882). Almost with unanimity the
various state courts seem to have
adopted the view against automatic
exclusion. Wigmore, op. cit., Note
26 A. L. R. 1491, Kendall v. May,
92 Mass. 59 (1865), Holcomb v.
Holcomb, 28 Conn. 177, (1859)
Burns v. State, 145 Wis. 373, 128 N.
W. 987 (1911). An elaboration of
the view may be found in State v.
Brown et al., 2 Marvel (Del.) 380,
36 AtI. 458 (1896), where the court
refused to accept a certificate of
admission to an insane, asylum as a
prima facie presumption of insanity
to make a witness incompetent to
testify.
The question of competency is
clearly one of law to be determined
by the court and in that determina-
tion it may be found proper to call
other witnesses to testify. District
of Columbia v. Armes, supra. In
the principal case the mother of
prosecutrix testified that her
daughter had to be helped in such
simple tasks as dressing and eat-
ing. The question of competency
of a witness should be disposed of
as soon as it arises and before the
witness is allowed to testify to the
facts in issue. Weeks v. State, 126
Md. 223, 94 Atl. 774 (191"5). How-
ever, mental infirmity ordinarily
goes to the weight of the witness'
evidence, not to competency to
testify, unless the impairment is
substantially total or such as to
render the person wholly uncon-
scious of the obligations of an oath.
Burns v. State, supra. In the prin-
cipal case the attempt to elicit from
the prosecutrix an expression of
any clear sense of moral responsi-
bility was futile.
The situation presented in the
principal case is not a new one in
American criminal law but the
question of the prosecutrix's com-
petency seems to have been dis-
cussed mainly on appeal from con-
viction rather than on appeal from
a refusal to allow a writ of ha-
beas corpus. Thus, in an early
New York case, People v. McGee,
1 Denio. 19 (1845), defendant had
been convicted of the rape of a
thirty year old imbecile who was
able to communicate only by signs.
Other witnesses had been allowed
to tell of her communications made
immediately after the alleged epi--
sode, but the prosecutrix did not
testify because it was thought that
she did not have sufficient intelli-
gence to be examined as a wit-
ness. In the face of other convinc-
ing evidence, the court was forced
to invoke the rule against hearsay
and reverse the conviction.
As in the principal case, how-
ever, the prosecution seems to have
usually presented the offended fe-
male as a witness in spite of her
mental infirmity. With the pos-
sible exception of Texas, the courts
seem to hold that if the prosecu-
trix has sufficient understanding to
appreciate the nature and obliga-
tion of an oath and sufficient ca-
pacity to observe and describe cor-
rectly the facts in regard to which
she is called to testify, there is no
reason why her testimony should
be excluded. 26 A. L. R. 1491. The
fact that the indictment alleges that
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the female is of unsound mind does
not per se establish her incompe-
tency. State v. Simes, 12 Idaho 310,
85 Pac. 914 (1906); People v. Perry,
26 Cal. App. 143, 146 Pac. 44 (1914);
State v. Prokosch, 152 Minn. 86,
187 N. W. 971 (1922); State v.
Leonard, 60 S. D. 144, 244 N. W.
88 (1932); Beard v. State, 37 Okla.
Cr. 62, 256 Pac. 354 (1927); Wil-
kinson v. People, 86 Colo. 406, 282
Pac. 257 (1929).
Several states have a statutory
prohibition against insane persons
testifying but such statutes have
been construed to follow the gen-
eral rule of Regina v. Hill. Pitts-
burgh & W. R. Co. v. Thompson,
82 Fed. 720 (1897), State v. Simes,
supra. Wisconsin has no such
positive statutory prohibition, but
on the contrary has a statute which
codifies the rule of Regina v. Hill.
Wis. Stat: (1938) sec. 325.30.
The rule seems to be different
under a Texas criminal statute
which says that "Insane persons
are not competent to testify, etc."
Vernon's Code of Crim. Proc., Art.
768. The broad rule of automatic
exclusion was set out in Lee v.
State, 43 Tex. Cr. 285, 64 S. W. 1047
(1901), where because the indict-
ment set out the insanity of the
prosecutrix she was held not to be
a competent witness. The harsh-
ness of any such rule is demon-
strated by a statement of the Texas
court itself in reversing the convic-
tion of a defendant who had been
charged with rape on an insane
negro woman by actual force. The,
court said that the facts "all tend
to show most conclusively and al-
most beyond a doubt that she had
indeed been ravished as she stated
that she had; and if, under our law,
she be held a competent witness
under any circumstances, we would
feel warranted in concluding from
RECENT CRIINAL CASES 749
the record, as it is shown to us,
that the defendant's guilt was fully
established by the evidence."
Lopez v. State, 30 Tex. App. 487,
17 S. W. 1058 (1891) The Texas
court itself shows a tendency to re-
strict the rule. See Hubbard v.
State, 66 Tex. Cr. Rep. 378, 147
S. W. 260 (1912).
It is submitted that the flexible
test as to competency of Regina v.
Hill which the Wisconsin court has
applied is the only one compatible
with modern understanding of
mental impairment. It must be
pointed out, however, that the
principal case is somewhat un-
usual in two respects: first, rather
than totally excluding her, the
feebleminded or insane witness is
usually allowed to testify before
a jury who may take her story for
what it is worth; that is, her men:
tal infirmity usually goes to her
credibility rather than to her com-
petence as a witness. And second-
ly, courts of appeal are generally
reluctant to judge the real charac-
ter or degree of intelligence of a
witness from mere paper evidence.
The judge or examining magistrate
who comes face to face with the
witnesses has a superior means to
evaluate their testimony. New
York Evening Post Co. v. Chaloner,
265 Fed. 204; writ of certiorari dis-
missed, 252 U. S. 591 (1920).
ROBERT FREDERICK WERNLE.
